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A TYPE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
FOR NATURAL LANGUAGE SEMANTICS:
THE MONTAGOVIAN GENERATIVE LEXICON
CHRISTIAN RETORE´
Abstract. We present a framework, named the Montagovian generative lexi-
con, for computing the semantics of natural language sentences, expressed in
many sorted higher order logic. Word meaning is depicted by lambda terms of
second order lambda calculus (Girard’s system F) with base types including a
type for propositions and many types for sorts of a many sorted logic. This
framework is able to integrate a proper treatment of lexical phenomena into
a Montagovian compositional semantics, including the restriction of selection
which imposes the nature of the arguments of a predicate, and the possible
adaptation of a word meaning to some contexts. Among these adaptations of a
word’s sense to the context, ontological inclusions are handled by an extension
of system F with coercive subtyping that is introduced in the present paper.
The benefits of this framework for lexical pragmatics are illustrated on meaning
transfers and coercions, on possible and impossible copredication over different
senses, on deverbal ambiguities, and on ”fictive motion”. Next we show that
the compositional treatment of determiners, quantifiers, plurals,... are finer
grained in our framework. We then conclude with the linguistic, logical and
computational perspectives opened by the Montagovian generative lexicon.
1. Introduction: word meaning and compositional semantics
The study of natural language semantic and its automated analysis is usually
divided into formal semantics, usually compositional, which has strong connections
with logic and with philosophy of language, and lexical semantics which rather
concerns word meaning and their interrelations, derivational morphology and knowl-
edge representation. Roughly speaking, given an utterance, formal semantics tries
to determine who does what according to this utterance, while lexical semantics
analyses the concepts under discussions and their interplay i.e. what it speaks about.
(1) A sentence: Some club defeated Leeds.
(2) Its formal semantics: ∃x : e (club(x) ∧ defeated(x, Leeds))
(3) Lexical semantics of the verb as found in a dictionary: defeat:
a. overcome in a contest, election, battle, etc.; prevail over; vanquish
b. to frustrate; thwart.
c. to eliminate or deprive of something expected
Although any applications in computational linguistics requires both formal and
compositional semantics rather applies in man machine dialogue, text generation
and lexical semantics in information retrieval and classification. Herein we shall
endow compositional semantics with a treatment of some of lexical semantics issues,
in particular for picking up the right word sense in a given context. Of course any
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2 CHRISTIAN RETORE´
sensible analyser, including human beings, or Moot’s Grail parser [41] combines
both the predicate argument structures and the relations between lexical meanings
to build a semantic representation and to understand the utterance.
1.1. The syntax of compositional semantics. As opposed to many contribu-
tions to the domain of linguistic known as ”formal semantics” the present paper
neither deals with reference nor with truth in a given situation: we only build a
logical formulae first order or higher order, single or many sorted) that can be
thereafter interpreted as one wants, if he wishes to. Hence are not committed to any
particular kind of interpretation like truth values, possible worlds, game semantics,...
In the traditional view as exposed by Montague, the process of semantic inter-
pretation of a sentence, consists in computing a logical formula including logical
modalities and intensional operators, from syntax and word meanings, and to inter-
pret it in possible world semantics. Although Montague thought that intermediate
steps were meaningless and should be wiped off just after computing truth values
and references, in this paper we precisely focus on the intermediate step, the logical
formula, that can be called the logical form of the sentence, with particular attention
to the way it is computed — for the time being, we leave out the interpretation of
these formulae. A reason for doing so is that we can encompass subtle questions, like
vague predicates, generalised and vague quantifiers, for which standard notions of
truth and references are inadequate possibly some interactive interpretation would
be better suited, e.g. like [1, 28]. Another reason is that, apart from these difficult
questions, we do not have modification to bring to standard interpretations.
1.2. Brief reminder on Montague semantics. Let us briefly remind the reader
how one computes the logical form according to the montagovian view. Assume for
simplicity that a syntactic analysis is a tree specifying for each node, which subtree
applies to the other one — the one that is applied is called the function while the
other is called its argument. A semantic lexicon provides a simply typed λ-term [w]
for each word w. The semantics of a leaf (hence a word) w is [w] and the semantic [t]
of a sub syntactic tree t = (t1, t2) is recursively defined as [t] = ([t1] [t2]) that is [t1]
applied to [t2], if [t1] is the function and [t2] the argument — and as [t] = ([t2] [t1])
otherwise, i.e. when [t2] is the function and [t1] the argument.
The typed λ-terms from the lexicon are given in such a way that the function
always has a semantic type of the shape a → b that matches the type a of the
argument, and the semantics associated with the whole tree has the semantic type t,
that is the type of propositions. This correspondence between syntactical categories
and semantic types, which extends into a correspondence between parse structures
and logical forms is crystal clear in categorial grammars, see e.g. [45, Chapter
3]. Typed λ-terms usually are defined out of two base types, e for individuals
(also known as entities) and t for propositions (which have a truth value). Logical
formulae can be defined in this typed λ-calculus as first observed by Church long
ago. This early use of lambda calculus, where formulae are viewed typed lambda
terms, can not be merged with the more familiar view of typed lambda terms as
proofs. The proof which such a typed lambda term correspond to is simply the
proof that the formula is well formed, e.g. that a two-place predicate is properly
applied to two individual terms of type e and not to more or less objects, nor to
objects of a different type etc. This initial vision of lambda calculus was designed
for a proper handling of substitution in deductive systems a` la Hilbert. One needs
constants for the logical quantifiers and connectives:
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word semantic type u∗
semantics : λ-term of type u∗
xv the variable or constant x is of type v
some (e→ t)→ ((e→ t)→ t)
λP e→t λQe→t (∃(e→t)→t (λxe(∧t→(t→t)(P x)(Q x))))
club e→ t
λxe(clube→t x)
defeated e→ (e→ t)
λye λxe ((speak aboute→(e→t) x)y)
Leeds e
Leeds
Figure 1. A simple semantic lexicon
Constant Type
∃ (e→ t)→ t
∀ (e→ t)→ t
Constant Type
and t→ (t→ t)
or t→ (t→ t)
implies t→ (t→ t)
Constant Type
defeated e→ (e→ t)
won, voted (e→ t)
Liverpool ,Leeds e
as well as predicates for the precise language to be described — a binary predicate
like won has the type e→ e→ t.
A small example goes as follows. Assume the syntax says that the structure of
the sentence ”Some club defeated Leeds.” is
(some (club)) (defeated Leeds)
where the function is always the term on the left. If the semantic terms are as in
the lexicon in figure 1, placing the semantical terms in place of the words yields a
large λ-term that can be reduced:
((
λP e→t λQe→t (∃(e→t)→t (λxe(∧(P x)(Q x)))))(λxe(clube→t x)))((
λye λxe ((defeatede→(e→t) x)y)
)
Leedse
)
↓ β(
λQe→t (∃(e→t)→t (λxe(∧t→(t→t)(clube→t x)(Q x)))))(
λxe ((defeatede→(e→t) x)Leedse)
)
↓ β(∃(e→t)→t (λxe(∧(clube→t x)((defeatede→(e→t) x)Leedse))))
This λ-term of type t that can be called the logical form of the sentence, represents
the following formula of predicate calculus (admittedly more pleasant to read):
∃x : e (club(x) ∧ defeated(x, Leeds))
The above described procedure is quite general: starting a properly defined
semantic lexicon whose terms only contains the logical constants and the predicates
of the given language one always obtain a logical formula. Indeed, such λ-terms
always reduce to a unique normal form and any normal λ-term of type t (preferably
η long, see e.g. [45, Chapter 3]) corresponds to a logical formula.
If we closely look at the Montagovian setting described above, we observe that it
is weaving two different ”logics”:
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Logic/calculus for meaning assembly: (a.k.a glue logic, metalogic,...) In
our example, this is simply typed λ-calculus with two base types e and t —
these terms are the proof in intuitionistic propositional logic.
Logic/language for semantic representations: In our example, that is
higher-order predicate logic.1
The framework we present in this paper mainly concerns the extension of the met-
alogic and the reorganisation of the lexicon in order to incorporate some phenomena
of lexical semantics, first of all restrictions of selection. Indeed, in the standard type
system above nothing prevents a mismatch between the real nature of the argument
and its expected nature. Consider the following sentences:2
(4) * A chair barks.
(5) * Jim ate a departure
(6) ? The five is fast
Although they can be syntactically analysed, they should not receive a semantical
analysis. Indeed, ”barks” requires a ”dog” or at least an ”animate” subject while a
”chair” is neither of them; ”departure” is an event, which cannot be an ”inanimate”
object that could be eaten; finally a ”number” like ”five” cannot do anything fast —
but there are particular contexts in which this can happen and we shall also handles
these meaning transfers.
1.3. The need of integrating lexical semantics in formal semantics. In
order to block the interpretation of the semantically illformed sentences above, it is
quite natural to use types, where the word type be both understood in its intuitive
and in its formal meaning. The type of the subject of barks should be ”dog”, the
type of ”fast” objects should be ”animate”, and the type of the object of ”ate”
should be ”inanimate”. Clearly, having, on the formal side a unique type e for all
entities is not sufficient.
The traditional view with a single type e for entities has another related
drawback. It is unable to relate related predicates, although a usual dictio-
nary does. A common noun like ”book” is usually viewed as a unary predicate
”book:e → t” while a transitive verb like ”read” is viewed as a binary predicate
”read:e→ e→ t” This gives the proper argument structure of Mary reads a book.
as (∃x : ebook(x) and reads(Mary, x)) but this traditional setting cannot relate
the predicates book and read — while any dictionary does. If we had several types,
as we shall do later on, we could stipulate that the object of ”read” ought to be
something that can be ”read”, that one can ”read” and ”write” a ”book”. Such
connections like predicates like ”book”, ”write”, ”read” would allow to interpret
sentences like ”I finished my book” which usually means ”I finished to read my book”
and sometimes ”I finished to write my book”.
Hence we need a more sophisticated type theory than the one initially used by
Montague to filter semantically invalid sentences. But in some cases some flexibility
is needed to accept and analyse sentences in which a word type is coerced into
another type. In sentence 6, in the context of a football match, the noun ”five” can
be considered as a player i.e. a ”person” who plays the match with the number 5
jersey, who can ”run” and be ”fast”.
1It can be first-order logic if reification is used, but this may induce unnatural structure and
exclude some readings.
2We use the standard linguistic notation: a ”* ” in front of a sentence points out that the
sentence is incorrect, a ”?” indicates that the correctness can be discussed and the absence of any
symbol in front means that the sentence is correct.
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There is a large literature on such lexical meaning transfers and coercions, starting
from 1980 [9, 10, 18, 48] — see also [27, 11] for a more recent account of some theories.
In those pioneering studies, the objective is mainly to classify these phenomena, to
find the rules that govern them. The quest of a computational formalisation that can
be incorporated into an automated semantic analyser appears with Pustejovsky’s
generative lexicon in 1991 [52, 53]. The integration of lexical issue into compositional
semantics la Montague and type theories appears with the work by Nicholas Asher
[4, 5] which lead to the book [2], and differently in some works of Robin Cooper
with an intensive use of records from type theory to recover frame semantics with
features and attributes inside type-theoretical compositional semantics [16, 17]
1.4. Type theories for integrating lexical semantics. As the afore mentioned
contribution suggest, finer-grained type theories are quite a natural framework both
for formal semantics a` la Montague and for selectional restriction and coercions.
Such a model must extend the usual ones into two directions:
(1) Montague’s original type system and metalogic should be enriched to en-
compass lexical issues (selectional restriction and coercions), and
(2) the usual phenomena studied by formal semantics (quantifiers, plurals,
generics) should be extended to this richer type system and so far only
Cooper and us did so [16, 17, 13, 44, 36, 30, 56]
At the end of this paper, we shall provide a comparison of the current approaches,
which mainly focus on 1. Let us list right now what the current approaches are:
• The system work with type based coercions and relies on some Modern
Type Theory (MTT) 3 — this correspond to the work of Zhaohui Luo
[33, 34, 64, 13]
• The system work with type based coercions and relies on usual typed λ-
calculus extended with some categorical logic rules — this approach by
Asher [4, 5] culminated in his book [2]
• The system work with term based coercions and relies on second order
λ-calculus — this is our approach, first introduced with Bassac, Mery, and
further developed with Mery, Moot, Pre´vot, Real-Coelho. [6, 43, 42, 44, 36,
29, 30, 56, 54, 55]
In fact our approach differs from the concurrent ones mainly because of the organ-
isation of the lexicon and of the respective roˆles of types and terms. Our approach
can be said to be word driven, as it account for the (numerous) idiosyncrasies of
natural language in particular the different behaviour of words of the same type is
coded by assigning them different terms, while others derive everything from the
types.
The precise type system we use, namely system F , does not make a big difference
with other type theories, and as far as the presentation of the system is concerned, it
is the simplest of all systems, because it only contains four term building operations
(two of them being the standard λ-calculus rules, the two other one being their
second order counter part) and two reduction rules (one of them being the usual
beta reduction and the other one being its second order counterpart). Dependent
types, that types defined from terms are not avoided.
2. A Montagovian generative lexicon
3This name Modern Type Theory (MTT) covers several variants of modern type theories,
including Martin-Lo¨f type theory, the Predicative Calculus of (Co)Inductive Constructions (pCic),
the Unifying Theory of dependent Types (UTT),... — this later one being the closest to the system
used by Zhaohui Luo
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for compositional semantic and lexical pragmatics
We are to present our solution for introducing some lexical issues in a composi-
tional framework a` la Montague.
2.1. Guidelines for a semantic lexicon. We should keep in mind that whatever
the precise solution presented, the following questions must be addressed in order
to obtain a computational model, so here are the guidelines of our model:
• What is the logic for semantic representation?
We use many-sorted higher order predicate calculus. As usual, the higher
order can be reified in first order logic, so it can be first order logic, but in
any case the logic has to be many sorted. Asher [2] is quite similar on this
point, while Luo use Type Theory [34].
• What are the sorts?
The sorts are the base types. As discussed later on these sorts may vary from
a small set of ontological kinds to any formula of one variable. We recently
proposed that they correspond to classifiers in language with classifiers: this
give sorts a linguistically and cognitively motivated basis. [38]
• What is the metalogic (glue logic) for meaning assembly?
We use second order λ-calculus (Girard system F ) in order to factor op-
erations that apply uniformly to family types. For specific coercions, like
ontological inclusion we use subtyping introduced in the present paper. Asher
[2] use simply typed λ-terms with additional categorical rules, while Luo also
use Type Theory with coercive subtyping [34].
• What kind of information is associated with a word in the lexicon?
Here it will be a finite set of λ-terms, one of them being called the principal
λ-term while the other are called optional. Other approaches make use more
specific terms and rules.
• How does one compose words and constituents for a compositional semantics?
We simply apply one λ-term to the other, following the syntactic analysis,
perform some transformations corresponding to coercions and presupposition,
and reduce the compound by β-reduction.
• How is rendered the semantic incompatibility of two components?
By type mismatch, between a function of type A→ X and an argument of
type B 6= A, and others do the same.
• How does one allow an a priori impossible composition?
By using the optional λ-terms, which change the types of at least one of the
two terms being composed, the function and argument. Both the function and
the argument may provide some optional lambda terms. Other approaches
rather use type driven rules.
• How does one allow and block felicitous and infelicitous copredications on
various aspect of a word?
An aspect car be explicitly declared as incompatible with any other aspect.
More recently we saw that linear types (linear system F ) can account for
compatibility between arbitrary subsets of the possible aspects. [37]
Each word in the lexicon is given a principal term, as well as a finite number,
possibly nought, optional terms that licence type change and implement coercions.
They may be inferred from an ordinary dictionary, electronic or not. Terms com-
bine almost as usual except that there might be type clashes, which accounts for
infringement of selectional restriction: in this case optional terms may be use to
solve the type mismatch. In case they lead to different results these results should
be considered as different possible readings — just as the different readings with
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different quantifier scopes are considered by formal semantics as different possible
readings of a sentence.
Let us first present the type and terms and thereafter we shall come back to the
the composition modes.
2.2. Remarks on the type system for semantics. We use a type system that
resembles Muskens Tyn [46] where the usual type of individuals, e is replaced with
a finite but large set of base types e1, . . . , en for individuals, for instance objects,
concepts, events,... These base types are the sorts of the many sorted logic whose
formulae express semantic representations. The set of base types as well as their
interrelations can express some ontological relations as Ben Avi and Francez thought
ten years ago [8]
For instance, assume we have a many sorted logic with a sort ζ for animals, a sort
φ for physical objects and a predicate eat whose arguments are of respective sort
φ and ζ the many sorted formula ∀z : ζ ∃x : φ eat(z, x) is rendered in type theory
by the λ-term: ∀ζ(λzζ∃φλxφ((eat x)z) with eat a constant of type φ → ζ → t.
Observe that the type theoretic formulation requires a quantifier for each sort α of
object, that is a constant ∀α of type (α→ t)→ t. 4
What are the base types? We have a tentative answer, but we cannot be too sure
of the answer. Indeed, this is a subtle question depending on ones philosophical
convictions, and also of the expected precision of the semantic representations.5 but
it does not really interfere with the formal and computational model we present
here. Let us mention some natural sets of bases types are, from the smallest to the
largest:
(1) A single type e for all entities (but as seen above it cannot account for
lexical semantics)
(2) A very simple ontology distinguishing events, physical objects, living entities,
concepts, ... (this resembles Asher’s position)
(3) Many Asian languages (Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Malay, Burmese, Nepali,...)
and all Sign Languages, have classifiers that are pronouns specific to classes
of nouns (100–400) especially detailed for physical objects that are handled,
animals.There are almost no classifiers in European languages. Nevertheless
a word like ”head” in ”Three heads of cattle.” can be considered as a
classifier. Hence classifiers are a rather natural set of base types, or the
importation of the classifiers of a language in one that does not have any.
But we do not claim that this is the definitive answer. For instance, for a
specific task, some other set of base types may be better. [38]
(4) A type per common noun as proposed by Luo in [34])
(5) A type for every formula with a single free variable as suggested by some
colleague (N. Asher or F. Corblin) after a talk of mine.
Our opinion is that types should be cognitively natural classes and rich enough
to express selectional restrictions. Whatever types are, there is a relation between
types and properties. With base types as in 5, the correspondence seems quite clear,
but, because types can be used to express new many sorted formulae, the set of
types is in this case defined as a least fixed point. For other sets of base types, e.g.
4 or 2 for each type τ there should be a corresponding predicate which recognises τ
entities among entities of a larger type. For instance, if there is a type dog there
should be a predicate d̂og : α→ t but what should be α the type of its argument?
4We do not speak about interpretations, but if one wishes to, we do not necessarily ask for
the usual requirement that sorts are disjoint: this is coherent with the fact that in type theory,
nothing prevents a pure term to have several types.
5For instance, a dictionary says that pregnant can be said of a ”woman or female animal”, but
can it be said of a ”grandma” or of a ”veal”?
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Should it be ”animal”, ”animate”,... the simplest solution is to assume a type of all
individuals, that is Montague’s e, and to say that corresponding to any base type τ ,
there is a predicate, namely τ̂ of type e→ t6
Let us say here a remark on the predicate constants in the language. If a predicate
constant, say Q is given with type u → t with u 6= e which sometimes is more
natural there is an obvious extension Qe which should be interpreted as false for
any object that cannot be viewed as an u-object. Given predicate in the language
do also have restrictions, Q|v which is defined as Q on q ∩ v where q is the domain
of Q and false elsewhere.
2.3. ΛTyn: many sorted formulae in second order lambda calculus. Since
we have many base types, and many compound types as well, it is quite convenient
and almost necessary to define operations over family of similar terms with different
types, to have some flexibility in the typing, and to have terms that act upon families
of terms and types. Hence we shall extend further Tyn into ΛTyn by using Girard’s
system F as the type system [21, 20]. System F involves quantified types whose
terms can be specialised to any type.
The types of ΛTynare defined as follows:
• Constants types ei and t, as well as type variables α, β, . . . are types.
• Whenever T and α respectively are a type and a type variable Πα. T is a
type. The type variable may or may not occur in the type T .
• Whenever T1 and T2 are types, T1 → T2 is a type as well.
The terms of ΛTyn, which encode proofs of quantified propositional intuitionistic
logic, are defined as follows:
• A variable of type T i.e. x : T or xT is a term, and there are countably
many variables of each type.
• In each type, there can be a countable set of constants of this type, and
a constant of type T is a term of type T . Such constants are needed for
logical operations and for the logical language (predicates, individuals, etc.).
• (f τ) is a term of type U whenever τ : T and f : T → U .
• λxT . τ is a term of type T → U whenever x : T , and τ : U .
• τ{U} is a term of type T [U/α] whenever τ : Λα. T , and U is a type.
• Λα.τ is a term of type Πα.T whenever α is a type variable, and τ : T a
term without any free occurrence of the type variable α in the type of a free
variable of τ .
The later restriction is the usual one on the proof rule for quantification in
propositional logic: one should not conclude that F [p] holds for any proposition p
when assuming G[p] — i.e. having a free hypothesis of type G[p].
The reduction of the terms in system F or its specialised version ΛTynis defined
by the two following reduction schemes that resembles each other:
• (λx.τ)u reduces to τ [u/x] (usual β reduction).
• (Λα.τ){U} reduces to τ [U/α] (remember that α and U are types).
As an example, we earlier said that in Tyn we needed a first order quantifier per
sort (.e. per base type). In ΛTynit is sufficient to have a single quantifier ∀, that is
a constant of type Πα. (α→ t)→ t . Indeed, this quantifier can be specialised to
specific types, for instance to the base type ζ, yielding ∀{ζ} : (ζ → t)→ t, or even
to properties of ζ objects, which are of type ζ → t, yielding ∀{ζ → t} : ((ζ → t)→
t) → t. We actually do quantify over higher types, for instance in the examples
6An alternative solution, used by us and others [56, 14] would be Πα. α→ t, using quantification
over types to be defined in next section.
THE MONTAGOVIAN GENERATIVE LEXICON 9
below respectively quantify over propositions with a human subject, and the next
one over propositions:
(7) He did everything he could to stop them.
(8) And he believes whatever is politically correct and sounds good.
As Girard showed [21, 20] reduction is strongly normalising and confluent every
term of every type admits a unique normal form which is reached no matter how one
proceeds. 7 The normal forms (which can be asked to be η-long) can be characterised
as follows (for a reference see e.g. [23]) :
Proposition 1. A normal Λ-term N of system F , β normal and η long to be
precise, has the following structure:
sequence of {· · · } and (· · · )
sequence of head applications to types Wk
λ and Λ abstractions variable and normal terms tXll
N =
︷ ︸︸ ︷
( λxXii | ΛXj )∗
︷ ︸︸ ︷
h(ΠXk|Xl→)
∗Z
︷ ︸︸ ︷
( {Wk} | tXll )∗ )
This has a good consequence for us, see e.g. [45, Chapter 3]:
Property 1 (ΛTynterms as formulae of a many-sorted logic). If the predicates,
the constants and the logical connectives and quantifiers are the ones from a many
sorted logic of order n (possibly n = ω) then the normal terms of ΛTyn of type t
unambiguously correspond to many sorted formulae of order n.
Let us illustrate how F factors uniform behaviours. Given types α, β, two
predicates Pα→t, Qβ→t, over entities of respective kinds α and β for any ξ with two
morphisms from ξ to α and to β, see figure 2 F contains a term that can coordinate
the properties P,Q of (the two images of) an entity of type ξ, every time we are in
a situation to do so — i.e. when the lexicon provides the morphisms.
Term 1. [Polymorphic AND] is defined as &Π =
ΛαΛβλPα→tλQβ→tΛξλxξλfξ→αλgξ→β . (andt→t→t (P (f x))(Q (g x)))
This can apply to say, a ”book”, that can be ”heavy” as a ”physical object”,
and ”interesting” as an ”informational content” — the limitation of possible over
generation is handled by the rigid use of possible transformations, including identity
to be defined thereafter.
2.4. Organisation of the lexicon and rules for meaning assembly. The
lexicon associate each word w with a principal λ-term [w] which basically is the
Montague term reminded earlier, except that the types appearing in [w] belong to
a much richer typed system. In particular, the numerous base types can impose
some selectional restriction. In addition to this principal term, there can be optional
λ-terms also called modifiers or transformations to allow, in some cases, composition
that were initially ruled out by selectional restriction.
There are two ways to solve a type conflict using those modifiers. Flexible
modifiers can be used without any restriction. Rigid modifiers turn the type, or the
sense of a word, into another one which is incompatible with other types or senses.
For a technical reason, the identity which is always a licit modifier is also specified
7This is one way to be convinced of the soundness of F , which defines types depending on
other types including themselves: as it is easily observed that there are no normal closed terms
of type ΠX. X ≡ ⊥ the system is necessarily coherent. Another way is to construct a concrete
model, called coherence spaces, where types are interpreted as countable sets with a binary relation
(coherence spaces), and terms up to normalisation are interpreted as structure preserving functions
(stable functions). [21]
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Figure 2. Polymorphic conjunction: P (f(x))&Q(g(x)) with x : ξ,
f : ξ → α, g : ξ → β.
word principal λ-term optional λ-terms rigid/flexible
book B̂ : e→ t IdB : B → B (f)
b1 : B → φ (f)
b2 : B → I (f)
town T̂ : e→ t IdT : T → T (f)
t1 : T → F (r)
t2 : T → P (f)
t3 : T → Pl (f)
Liverpool liverpoolT IdT : T → T (f)
t1 : T → F (r)
t2 : T → P (f)
t3 : T → Pl (f)
vast vast : Pl→ t
voted voted : P → t
won won : F → t
where the base types are defined as follows:
φ physical objects
B book
I information
T town
P people
Pl place
Figure 3. A sample lexicon
to be flexible or rigid. In this later rigid case, it means that the original sense is
incompatible with any other sense, although two other senses may be compatible.
Consequently, every modifier, i.e. optional λ-term is declared, in the lexicon, to
be either a rigid modifier, noted (r) or a flexible one, noted (f). More subtle
compatibility relations between senses can be represented by using the linear version
of system F as we did in [37]
The reader may be surprised that we repeat the morphisms in the lexical entries,
rather than having general rules. For instance, one could also consider morphisms
that are not anchored in a particular entry: in particular, they could implement the
ontology at work in [53] as the type-driven approach of Asher does [2]. For instance,
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a place (type Pl) could be viewed as a physical object (type φ) with a general
morphism P2φ turning places into physical objects that can be ”vast”. We are not
fully enthusiastic about a general use of such rules since it is hard to tell whether
they are flexible or rigid. As they can be composed they might lead to incorrect
copredications, while their repetition inside each entry offers a better control of
incorrect and correct copredications. One can think that some meaning transfer
differs although the words have the same type. An example of such a situation
in French is provided the words ”classe” and ”promotion”, which both refer to
groups of pupils. The first word ”classe” (English: ”class”) can be coerced into the
room where the pupils are taught, (the ”classroom”), while the second, ”promotion”
(English: ”class” or ”promotion”) cannot.
There nevertheless exist ontological inclusions that are better represented by rules
on types, like ”car” that are ”vehicles” that are ”artefacts”. This is the reason why
we also allow for optional terms that are available for all words of the same type.
This is done by subtyping and more precisely by the notion of coercive subtlyping
that is introduced in section 3.4.
3. A proper account of meaning transfers
In this section we shall see that the lexicon we propose, provides a proper account
of the lexical phenomena that motivated its definition: ill typed readings are rejected,
coerced readings are handled, felicitous copretication are analysed while infelicitous
ones are rejected. Some particular case of coerced readings are given a finer analysis
as the polysemy of deverbals (nouns derived verbs, like ”construction”), or fictive
motion. Finally we introduce coercive subtyping for system F which handles general
coercions corresponding to ontological inclusion.
3.1. Coercions and copredication. One can foresee what is going to happen,
using the lexicon given in figure 3 with sentences like:
(9) Liverpool is vast.
(10) Liverpool is vast and voted (last Sunday).
(11) # Liverpool voted and won (last Sunday).
Our purpose is not discuss whether this or that sentence is correct, nor whether
this or that copredication is felicitous, but to provide a formal and computational
model which given sentences that are assumed to be correct, derives the correct
readings, and which given sentences that are said to be incorrect, fails to provide a
reading.
Ex. 9 This sentence leads to a type mismatch vastPl→t(LiverpoolT )), since ”vast”
applies to ”places” (type Pl) and not to ”towns” as ”Liverpool”. It is solved
using the optional term tT→Pl3 provided by the entry for ”Liverpool”, which
turns a town (T ) into a place (Pl) vastPl→t(tT→Pl3 Liverpool
T )) — a single
optional term is used, the (f)/ (r)difference is useless.
Ex. 10 In the second example, the fact that Liverpool is vast is derived as pre-
viously, and the fact Liverpool voted is obtained from the transforma-
tion of the town into people, that can vote. The two can be conjoined
by the polymorphic ”and” defined above as term 1 (&Π) because these
transformations are flexible: one can use one and the other. We can
make this precise using only the rules of the type calculus. The syn-
tax yields the predicate (&Π(is vast)Pl→t(voted)P→t) and consequently
the type variables should be instantiated by α := Pl and β := P and
the exact term is &Π{Pl}{P}(is vast)Pl→t(voted)P→t which reduces to:
Λξλxξ λfξ→αλgξ→β(andt→t)→t (is vast (f x))(voted (g x))).
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Syntax also says this term is applied to ”Liverpool”. which forces the
instantiation ξ := T and the term corresponding to the sentence is after
some reduction steps,
λfT→PlλgT→P (and (is vast (f LiverpoolT ))(voted (g LiverpoolT )))). For-
tunately the optional λ-terms t2 : T → P and t3 : T → Pl are provided by
the lexicon, and they can both be used, since none of them is rigid. Thus
we obtain, as expected
(and (is vastP l→ t (tT→Pl3 LiverpoolT ))(votedPl→t (tT→P2 LiverpoolT )))
Ex. 11 The third example is rejected as expected. Indeed, the transformation of
the town into a football club prevents any other transformation (even the
identity) to be used in the polymorphic and that we defined above. We
obtain the same term as above, with won instead of is vast. The term
is: λfT→PlλgT→P (and (won (f LiverpoolT ))(voted (g LiverpoolT )))) and
the lexicon provides the two morphisms that would solve the type conflict,
but one of them is rigid, i.e. we can solely use this one. Consequently the
sentence is semantically invalid.
3.2. Fictive motion. A rather innovative extension is to apply this technique to
what Talmy called fictive motion [61]. Under certain circumstances, a path may
introduce a virtual traveller following the path, as in sentences like:
(12) Path GR3 descends for two hours.
Because of the duration, one cannot consider that the vertical coordinate decreases
as the curvilinear abscissa increases. One ought to consider someone who follows
the road. We model this by one morphism associated with the ”Path GR3” and
one with ”descends”. The first coercion turns the ”Path GR3 ” from an immobile
object into an object of type ”path” that can be followed and the second one coerce
”descends” into a verb that acts upon a ”path” object and introduce an individual
following the path downwards — this individual, which does not need to exist,
is quantified, yielding a proposition that can be paraphrased as ”any individual
following the path goes downwards for two hours”. [43, 42]
3.3. Deverbals. Deverbals are nouns that correspond to action verbs, as ”building”
or ”signature”. Usually they are ambiguous between result and process. We showed
that our idiosyncratic model is well adapted since their possible senses vary from
one deverbal to another, even if the verbs are similar and the suffix is the same.
(13) The building took three months.
(14) The building was painted white.
(15) * The building that took three months was painted white.
(16) The signature was illegible.
(17) The signature took three months.
(18) * Although it took three months the signature was illegible.
(19) Although it took one minute, the signature was illegible.
We showed that a systematical treatment of deverbal meaning as the one proposed
by the type-driven approach does not properly account for the data. Indeed, the
possible meanings of a deverbal are more diverse than result and event, and there
are no known rules to make sure the deverbal refers to the event. Consequently,
words must include in the lexical informations such at the possible meanings of the
deverbal. These meanings can be derived from the event expressed by the verb, they
usually include the event itself (but not always), the result (but not always), and
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other meanings as well like the place where the event happens (e.g. English noun
”pasture”). This lexical information can be encoded in our framework, with one
principal meaning and optional terms for accessing other senses and the flexibility
or rigidity of these optional terms — they are usually ridig, and copredication on
the different senses of a deverbal is generally infelicitous. W successfully applied
our framework and treatment to the semantic of deverbals to the of restrictions
of selection (both for the deverbal and for the predicate that may apply to the
deverbal) to meaning transfers, and to the felicity of copredications on different
senses of a deverbal. [54, 55]
3.4. Coercive subtyping and ontological inclusions. As we said earlier on,
ontological inclusions like ”Human beings are animals.”, would be better modelled
by optional terms that are available for any word of the type, instead of anchoring
them in words and repeating these terms for every word of this type. The model we
described can take these subtyping inclusions into account as standard coercions,
by specifying that a word like ”human being” introduces a transformation into
an ”animal”. But this is somehow heavy, since one should also say that ”human
beings” are ”living beings” etc. Any predicate, that applies to a class, also applies
to an ontologically smaller class. For instance, ”run” that applies to ”animals” also
applies to ”human beings”, because the ”human” is a subtype of ”animals”. These
subtype coercions looks type driven, and, consequently, would be more faithfully
modelled with a proper notion of subtyping.
Coercive subtyping, introduced by Luo and Soloviev[35, 60] for variants of Martin-
Lo¨f type theory, corresponds quite well to these particular transformations. It starts
with a transitive and acyclic set of coercions between base types, with at most one
coercion between any two base types, and ontological inclusions fulfil this condition.
Indeed, such ontological inclusions when viewed as functions always are the identity
on objects, hence there cannot be two different manners to map them in the larger
type. Furthermore, other notions of subtyping that have been studied for higher
order type theories are very complicated with tricky restriction on the subtyping
rules. [12, 32]
Coercive subtyping, noted A0 < A, can be viewed as a short hand for allowing
a predicate or a function which applies to A-objects to apply to an argument
whose type A0 is not the expected type A but a subtype A0 of A. Hence coercive
application is exactly what we were looking for:
coercive application
f : A→ B u : A0 A0 < A
(f a) : B
The subtyping judgements, which have the structure of categorical combinators,
are derived with very natural rules given in figure 4. These rules simply encode
transitivity, covariance and contravariance of implicative types (arrow types), and
quantification over type variables.
It should be observed that, given constants ci→j representing the coercions from
ei to ej , any coercion derivable coercion T < U can be depicted by a linear Λ-term
m : U of system F or ΛTynwith a single occurrence of the free variable x : T and
occurrences of the constants ci→j . The construction of the term according to the
derivation rules is defined as follows:
• transitivity
x : A < t : B y : B < u : C
x : A < u[y := t] : C
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. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
transitivity
A < B B < C
A < C
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
covariance and contravariance of implication
A < B C < D
D → A < C → B
A < B
T → A < T → B
A < B
B → T < A→ T
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
quantification over types
U < T [X]
X not free in U
U < ΠX.T [X]
U < ΠX.T [X]
U < T [W ]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 4. Rules for coercive subtyping in system F
• covariance and contravariance of implication
–
x : A < t : B z : C < u : D
f : D → A < λzCt[x := f(u)] : C → B
–
x : A < t : B
f : T → A < λwT t[x := f(w)] : T → B
–
x : A < t : B
g : B → T < λxA.g(t) : A→ T
• quantification over types
–
u : U < t : T [X]
X not free in U
u : U < ΛX.t : ΠX.T [X]
–
u : U < t : ΠX.T [X]
u : U < t{W} : T [W ]
As an easy induction shows that:
Proposition 2. All terms derived in this system are linear, with a single occurrence
of a single free variable (whose type is on the left of ”¡”).
From this one easily concludes that:
Proposition 3. Not all Λ-terms of system F can be derived in the subtyping system.
Any derivation c of ei < ej is equivalent to a coercion ci→j , i.e. our derivation
system does not introduce new coercions between atomic types. This kind of result is
similar to coherence in categories: given a compositional graph G, the free cartesian
categories over G does not contain any extra morphism between object from the
compositional graph. Here is the precise formulation of this coherence result:
Proposition 4. Given a ei < ej-derivation whose associated Λ-term is C˜, the
normal form C of C˜ is a compound of ci→j applied to x : ei, which, because of the
assumptions on the ci→j is some ch→k.
THE MONTAGOVIAN GENERATIVE LEXICON 15
Proof. As seen above, a deduction of T < U clearly corresponds to a linear Λ-terms
of system F , whose only free variable is x : T with the ci→j as constants. Hence
it has a normal from which also has a single free variable is x : T and the ci→j as
constants.
Let us show that any normal Λ-term C of type ej with a single free variable x : ei
and constants ci→j : ei → ej is a compound of ci→j applied to xei , i.e. a term of
Ci:
• xei ∈ Ci
• if cej ∈ Ci then (cj→k(c))ek ∈ Ci
We proceed by induction on the number of occurrences of variable and constants
in the normal term C, whose from is, as said in proposition 1:
sequence of head sequence of {· · · } and (· · · ) applications
λ and Λ abstractions variable to types Wk and normal terms t
Xl
l
C =
︷ ︸︸ ︷
( λxXii | ΛXj )∗
︷ ︸︸ ︷
h(ΠXk|Xl→)
∗Z
︷ ︸︸ ︷
( {Wk} | tXll )∗ )
If the term C corresponds to a proof of ei < ej there is no ( λxXii | ΛXj ) in front,
because the ej is neither of the form U → V nor of the form ΠX. T [X]. What may
be the head variable? It is either the only free variable of this term, namely xei , or
a constant i.e. a ck→l.
• If the head variable is xei then, because of its type, there is no application
to a type or to a normal term ( {Wk} | tXll )∗ ) arguments, hence ei = ej
and the normal form is xei , which is in Ci
• If the head variable is is some ck→l, which because of its type, may only be
applied to a normal term tXll of type ek. This normal term is a normal term
of type ek with xei as its single free variable and the constants cj→l. As t
Xl
l
has one symbol less than C, we can conclude that tXll is in Ci hence C ∈ Ci.
Hence in any case the normal form C : ej of the term C˜ : ej is in Ci.
Now, given that the coercions ci→j enjoys ck→j ◦ ci→j = ci→k (as part of our
condition on base coercions) it is easily seen that the only term of type ej in Ci is
ci→j . 
We think that this coherence result can be improved by showing that there is at
most one normal term corresponding to a derivation S < T , although the proof is
likely to use some variant of reducibility candidates.
An alternative. The rules for coercive sub tying follow a natural deduction style, as
lambda terms of system F . Nevertheless, an alternative formulation of the quantifier
elimination rule which requires to have identity axioms (whose term is identity) to
derive obvious sub tying relations.
alternative quantifier elimination rule (sequent calculus style)
s : S[T ] < t : U
s˙ : ΠX.S[X] < t[s := s˙{T}]
4. Compositional semantics issues: determiners, quantifiers, plurals
So far we focused on phenomena in lexical semantics that are usually left out
of standard models but properly mastered by our model. But we must also have a
look at compositional semantics, that is a as the logical structure of a sentence, to
see whether our model still properly analyses what standard compositional models
do, and, possibly provide better analysis. Hopefully sentence structure are correctly
analysed but furthermore our extended setting is quite appealing for some classical
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issues in formal semantics like determiners and quantification, or plurals, as we
show in this section.
4.1. Determiners and quantifiers. The examples presented so far only involved
proper names because the determiners and quantifiers are a bit more complex than
in the usual montagovian setting, let us see how they work.
In order to integrate lexical issues into compositional semantics which closely
follows syntax, we should at least describe the behaviour of determiners and quan-
tifiers in our framework. We adopt the view of quantified, definite, and indefinite
noun phrases as individual terms by using generic elements (or choice functions) as
initiated by Russell and formalised by Hilbert, Ackerman and Bernays see e.g. [22]
and adapted to linguistics by researchers like von Heusinger see e.g. [19, 62, 63].
How do we adapt our model, in particular the typing, if instead of ”Liverpool”
the examples used ”The town”, ”A town”, ”All towns”, or ”Most towns”? Indefinite
determiners, quantifiers, generalised quantifiers,... usually are viewed as functions
from two predicates to propositions, one expressing the restriction and the other
the main predicate see e.g. [50]
As we said, and this is especially true in a categorial setting as the one Moot im-
plemented [41] the syntactic structure closely corresponds to the semantic structure.
But the usual treatment of quantification that we saw in subsection 1 infringe this
correspondence:
(20) sentence: Keith played some Beatles song.
(21) semantical structure: (some (Beatles songs)) (λx Keith played x)
(22) syntactical structure: (Keith (played (some (Beatles song))))
Another criticism that applies to the usual treatment of quantifiers is the symmetry
that it wrongly introduces between the main predicate and the class over which
one quantifies. For instance, the two sentences below (23,24) usually have the same
logical form (25):
(23) Some politician are crooks.
(24) ? Some crooks are politicians.
(25) ∃x.politician(x)&crook(x)
Hence, in accordance with syntax, we prefer to consider that a quantified noun
phrase is by itself some individual — a generic one which does not refer to a precise
individual nor to a collection of individuals. As [62] we use a η for indefinite
determiners (whose interpretation picks up a new element) and ι for definite noun
phrases8 (whose interpretation picks up the most salient element). In fact both ι
and η correspond to Hilbert’s  it is only the interpretation of the two which differ.
Although papers and even a book [31] have been published on the topic, up to now
results on these operators do not go beyond Hilbert, Ackerman and Bernays results
in [22] and in particular there is not yet a sound interpretation that would match
the natural proof theoretical rules given by Hilbert.
and τ , and others for generalised quantifiers. All those operators takes as
arguments a predicate P involving a free variable x P (x) and return a term. The
ι term is written as the term ιx. P (x) in which the variable x is bound — the
syntactical behaviour of the other generic elements introduced by , τ, η, ... is just
8Actually [62] writes  instead of ι. We do not follow his notation because we also use Hilbert’s
 with its traditional meaning.
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the same. The main problem is to provide a proper typing of such operators which
fits in our model. 9
In a typed model, a predicate applying to α-objects is of type α→ t. Consequently
ι should be of type: (α → t) → α, and in order to have a single ι its type is
Πα. (α→ t)→ α. Consequently, if we have a predicate ”Dog” of ”Animate” entities
the term ι(Dog) (written ιx. Dog(x) in untyped models) the semantics of ”the dog”
is of type ”Animate”.... but we would like this term to be of type Dog if ”dog” is a
type, or to enjoy the property Dog, if Dog is a property. How do we say so, since
the type Dog does not appear in ι? Indeed, only ”animate” objects appear in ι as
an instantiation of α. We solve this by adding a systematic presupposition that can
be called an axiom, P (ι(P )) for any P of type e→ t 10
The syntax of quantifiers and generalised quantifiers is defined in the same
way. Existential quantification ”some” is faithfully represented by Hilbert’s epsilon
operator: P (xP (x)) ≡ ∃x. P (x). As soon as some element enjoys the property P ,
the term x. P (x) enjoys P as well.
The operator τ symmetrically constructs the generic element that appear in
mathematical proofs like ”Let x be any integer . . . Thus for all integers . . . ” This
universal generic represents universal quantification because P (τx. P (x)) ≡ ∀x. P (x):
as soon as the term τx. P (x) enjoys the property P any element does. Actually,
the  operator is enough, since τx. P (x) = x.(¬P (x)) and x. P (x) = τx.(¬P (x))
As it is well known determiners — at least some use of them — correspond to
quantifiers, and that’s the way determiners are modelled in our framework, see e.g.
[58, 57]. It avoids the problems evoked in examples 20 and 24.
It should be observed that generics fit better into our typed and many sorted
semantic representations. Indeed, intuitively it is easier to think of a generic
”politician” or ”song” than it is to think of a generic ”entity” or ”individual”.
One can even introduce constants that model generalised quantification. They
are typed just the same way, and this construct can be applied to compute the
logical form of statement including the ”most” quantifier, as exposed in [56]. It does
not mean that we have the sound and complete proof rules nor a model theoretical
interpretation: we simply are able to automatically compute logical forms from
sentences involving generalised quantifiers.
4.2. Individuals, plurals and sets in a type-theoretical framework. The
organisation of the types also allows us to handle simple facts about plurals, as
shown in [44, 36] — which resembles some Partee’s ideas of [49]. Here are some
classical examples involving plurals, exemplifying some typical readings for plurals:
(26) . *Keith met.
(27) Keith and John met. (unambiguous).
(28) *The student met.
(29) The students met. (unambiguous, one meeting)
(30) The committee met. (unambiguous, one meeting)
(31) The committees met. (ambiguous: one big meeting, one meeting per com-
mittee, several meetings invoking several committees)
(32) The students wrote a paper. (unambiguous)
(33) The students wrote three papers. (covering)
9Actually, we first provided a type theoretical model,and then discovered earlier related work
in untyped semantics, e.g. papers by Heusinger.
10If the predicate P corresponds to a type τ i.e. P = τ̂ , this presupposition is better written as
ι(τ̂) : τ .
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q Λαλxαλyαx = y
∗ ΛαλPα→tλQα→t∀xαQ(x)⇒ P (x)
# ΛαλR(α→t)→tλSα→t)→t∀Pα→tS(P )⇒ R(P )
c ΛαλR(α→t)→tλPα→t∀xαP (x)⇒ ∃Qα→tQ(x) ∧ (∀yαQ(y)⇒ P (y)) ∧R(Q)
Figure 5. Operators for plurals
Such readings are derivable in our model because one can define in F operators
for handling plurals. Firstly, on can add, as a constant, a cardinality operator for
predicates || || : Πα.(α→ t)→ N (using the internal integers of system F which are
N = ΠX. (X → X) → (X → X), or predefined integers as in Go¨del system T or
most type theories). Next, as shown in figure 5 , we can have operators for handling
plurals: q (turning an individual into a property/set), ∗ (distributivity) # (restricted
distributivity from sets of sets to its constituent subsets), c (for coverings)... The
important fact is that the computation of such readings uses exactly the same
mechanisms as lexical coercion. Some combinations are blocked by their types, but
optional terms coming tier from the predicate or from the plural noun may allow
an a priori prohibited reading. To be precise we also provided specific tools for
handling groups that are singular nouns denoting a set.
5. Comparison with related work and conclusion
5.1. Variants and implementation. In the afore presented model, some points
admit slight changes that do not affect the behaviour.
As discussed in the beginning of section 2 the base type can be discussed. We
proposed to use classifiers as base types of a language with classifiers, because
classifiers are linguistically and cognitively motivated classes of words and entities.
But it is fairly possible that other sets of base types are better suited in particular
for specific applications. [38]
In relation to this issue, the inclusion between base types, that in our model are
morphisms can be introduced with words or as general axioms. We prefer the first
solution which allows idiosyncratic behaviours, dependent on words as explained
in paragraph 2.4 with ”classe” and ”promotion”. Nevertheless when dealing with
ontological inclusions, or other very general coercions, we think a subtyping approach
is possible and reduces the size of the lexicon, this is why we are presently exploring
coercive subtyping.
The type we gave for predicate can also vary: it could be systematically e→ t,
but as explained in paragraph 4, types u→ t are possible as well, and varying from
one form to another is not complicated.
An important variant is to define the very same ideas within a compositional
model like λ-DRT [47] the compositional view of Discourse Representation Theory
[24] which can, as its name suggest, handle discursive phenomena. Thus one can
integrate the semantical and lexical issues presented here into a broader perspective.
This can be done, and in fact several applications of the model presented here are
already included into the Grail parser by Richard Moot, in particular for French [41].
The grammar is an automatically acquired grammar but unfortunately the refined
semantic terms we need can only be typed by hand. Consequently we only tested
the semantic analyses described herein on small or specific lexicon. For instance,
four treatment of fictive motion (cf. subsection ?? has been tested with a detailed
lexicon for spatial semantics, but with λ-DRT [42] rather than plain lambda calculus
[43] .
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5.2. Comparison with related work. There are many similarities with the con-
temporary work by Asher and Luo described e.g. in [3, 34, 13].
A first difference is the type system. Our type system, F , is quite powerful
but simple: four-term building operations, and two reduction rules. Luo make use
of a version of Modern Type Theories (MTT), closed to the Unifying Theory of
dependent Types (UTT), whose expressive power and computational complexity is
difficult to compare: it is predicative but it include dependent types. Hence it is
not clear whether MTT better characterises the logic needed for meaning assembly.
Quantification over type variable is quite comparable and allows ∀α : CN which is
quite convenient although it can certainly be encoded within system F using the fact
that finites sums can be defined in system F , hence x : α, α : CN can be rephrased
if there are finitely many CN — finite products can be fined as well. This is both a
positive and negative feature of system F : it can encode many things, but encodings
are often dull. In addition, the MTT that Luo uses, includes dependent types, i.e.
types defined from terms, which are convenient — the way they are used so far can
probably be encoded in system F , but encoding can be tedious. A possible solution,
similar to [59], is too introduce predefined types F with specific reduction schemes —
e.g. adding integers as in Go¨del’s system T.
Regarding coercions, Luo [33] makes an extensive use of coercive subtyping,
that he introduced with Soloviev [60]: as said in this paper this kind of subtyping
may also work well with system F . So we can say that Luo system is very similar.
Dependent types, predicative quantification, may be closer to what we wish to model,
but the formal diversity of the many rules may result in an opaque formalisation.
The typed system at work in Asher’s view [2] is a simple type theory extended with
type constructs and operations from category theory. The theory extends cartesian
closed category with a few of the many operations that one finds in a topos, like
subtype. This approach is hardly compared with the two above, since it does not
belong to the same family: morphisms do not represents (quotiented) proofs of some
logic, they are closer to a set theoretic interpretation.
Another ingredient of our models are the base types. Asher leaves the set of
base types open, but rather small(say a dozen) : e, t, physical object, etc., with
a linguistically motivated subtyping relation < defined over these types. Luo,
especially in his later article [34], wants to equate base types with common nouns
(also with coercions between them), and this is a possible compromise between any
formula and the minimal base type system which makes it difficult to express some
selectional restrictions with types. However it seems that they are too many of
them, since not any common noun appears as a restriction of selection for another
reword in a dictionary. Classifiers as base types is a recent proposal of ours which
seems cognitively and linguistically motivated. It is worth exploring this hypothesis
empirically in corpora and tests.
The subtyping relation between the base types are language independent in these
two models, i.e. they are not triggered by words, but simply by types. We opted for
a compromise in which only ontological inclusions are type driven, using coercive
sub typing.
Regarding the general organisation of the lexicon and of its composition modes,
the same difference applies. While according to Asher and Luo the types determine
the coercions, in our approach the coercions are provided by the terms in the
lexicon, i.e. by the words themselves and not by their types, with an exception for
ontological inclusions. The recent claim by Luo that base type should be common
nouns (that are words) partly rubs out the differences between on one hand the
type driven approaches of himself and Asher and, on the other hand, ours which is
more idiosyncratic being based on words and terms.
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Finally one may wonder whether we finally derive similar logical forms? They
actually are quite similar: we derive higher order multi sorted logical formulae multi
sorted, Asher derives formulae in an intuitionnistic set theory, which works with
sorts, and Luo derives formulae of type theory. All these are more or less the same:
higher order is possible although not extensively used in examples, and there are
sorts or types.
A possible difference may lie in the distance with syntax and the effective
computability of the semantic representation, which requires a treatment of the
current constructs in compositional semantics, like determiners, quantifiers, plurals,...
and to be integrated in a general analyse also including phenomena like time or
aspect. For the time being we did more on such issues than the others, but I am
pretty sure that a similar treatment is possible within the approach developed by
Asher and Luo.
5.3. Perspectives. A part from fixing up the optimal variant among the possible
variants of our model, to study and develop the convergence with related work, or
to develop the implementation there are some questions both on type theory and
on linguistic modelling, both theoretical and practical, that deserve to be further
studied.
The acquisition of the semantic lexicon has both theoretical and practical aspects.
In particular, how could one acquire the optional lambda terms? Syntactic informa-
tions on words can be automatically acquired, and Moot’s parser that we used for
experimenting our type theoretical semantic analyses was automatically acquired.
[40, 39] By now there are some techniques to acquire the usual semantic terms of
Montague semantics of 1 that are associated with words and depicts their argument
structure. [65] Machine learning and serious games also apply to learn some relation
between words see e.g. [15, 26] But up to now there are no learning algorithms
for acquiring a set of base type, nor for determining given a set of base type, the
optional lambda terms, and our experiments with Moot parser were performed using
hand typed semantic lexicon.
On the logical side there are many intriguing questions.
• One is the relation in a type system with sorts between the (higher or-
der) predicate calculus and the type system, exemplified by the relation
between the relation between type judgements x : T that, as linguistic
presuppositions, cannot be denied and predicates T̂ (x) that can be denied.
• The Hilbert operator  which look more natural in this typed system deserve
to be further studied. Since most of the results are false but Hilbert’s original
results, the study of both the deductive system and the interpretation of
those operators is appealing. We are especially intrigued by the formula
with Hilbert operators that have no corresponding formula in usual logic.
• The coercive subtyping we introduced in this paper should also be further
explored, e.g. by proving that there is at most one coercion between any
two types.
• It is quite clear that we do not need the full power of system F : we chose this
system of variable types and quantified types for its simplicity and elegance.
Nevertheless one may wonder whether a simple restriction that would be
sufficient. Linear version of system F both have a lower complexity [25] and
allow a finer grained treatment of the constraints on sense compatibility.
[37]
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Regarding computational linguistics, and natural language processing application,
the way the discourse context is handled, including the permanence and the prop-
agation of constraints (e.g. on sense compatibilities) through linguistic structure.
Observe that:
(34) This salmon was living nearby Scottish coast. It was delicious.
(35) ? This salmon that was living nearby Scottish coast was delicious.
(36) * This salmon was living nearby Scottish coast and was delicious.
As a major challenge in the semantics of natural language on which this type
theoretical and many sorted view might bring new lights is the semantics of mass
nouns, like wine, which can be quantified:
(37) He drank some wine.
(38) He drank all the wine.
Thanks. Special thanks to Serge¨ı Soloviev for his explanations on coercive subtyping
during my CNRS sabbatical at IRIT. Many thanks to those I worked with on these
questions R. Moot, , M. Abrusci, Ch. Bassac, B. Mery, L. Pre´vot L. Real and to
the ones I discussed with, namely N. Asher, Z. Luo, M. Abrusan, C. Beyssade, H.
Burnett, S.-J. Conrad, F. Corblin, A. Mari, H. Person, F. del Prete.
References
[1] Vito Michele Abrusci and Christian Retore´. Quantification in ordinary language: from a critic
of set-theoretic approaches to a proof-theoretic proposal. In Peter Schro¨der-Heister, editor,
14th Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Sciences, 2011.
[2] Nicholas Asher. Lexical Meaning in context – a web of words. Cambridge University press,
2011.
[3] Nicholas Asher and Zhaohui Luo. Formalization of coercions in lexical semantics. In Emmanuel
Chemla, Vincent Homer, and Gre´goire Winterstein, editors, Sinn und Bedeutung 17, pages
63–80, 2012. http://semanticsarchive.net/sub2012/.
[4] Nicholas Asher and James Pustejovsky. The metaphysics of words in contexts, 2000.
[5] Nicolas Asher. A type driven theory of predication with complex types. Fundamenta Infor-
maticae, 84(2):151–183, 2008.
[6] Christian Bassac, Bruno Mery, and Christian Retore´. Towards a Type-Theoretical Account of
Lexical Semantics. Journal of Logic Language and Information, 19(2):229–245, April 2010.
http://hal.inria.fr/inria-00408308/.
[7] Denis Be´chet and Alexander Ja. Dikovsky, editors. Logical Aspects of Computational Linguis-
tics - 7th International Conference, LACL 2012, Nantes, France, July 2-4, 2012. Proceedings,
volume 7351 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2012.
[8] Gilad Ben-Avi and Nissim Francez. Categorial grammars with ontology-refined types. In Cate-
gorial grammars – an efficient tool for natural language processing, pages 99–113, Montpellier,
June 2004. C.N.R.S.
[9] Manfred Bierwisch. Wo¨rtliche bedeutung - eine pragmatische gretchenfrage. In G. Grewendorf,
editor, Sprechakttheorie und Semantik, pages 119–148. Surkamp, Frankfurt, 1979.
[10] Manfred Bierwisch. Semantische und konzeptuelle repra¨sentation lexikalischer einheiten. In
R. Ru˙z˘ic˘ka and W. Motsch, editors, Untersuchungen zur Semantik, pages 61–99. Akademie-
Verlag, Berlin, 1983.
[11] Reinhard Blutner. Lexical semantics and pragmatics. In Fritz Hamm and Thomas Ede
Zimmermann, editors, Semantics, volume 10 (Sonderheft), pages 27–58, Hamburg, 2002.
Buske.
[12] Luca Cardelli, Simone Martini, John C. Mitchell, and Andre Scedrov. An extension of system
F with subtyping. Information and Computation, 109(1/2):4–56, 1994.
[13] Stergios Chatzikyriakidis and Zhaohui Luo. An account of natural language coordination in
type theory with coercive subtyping. In Denys Duchier and Yannick Parmentier, editors, 7th
International Workshop on Constraint Solving and Language Processing (CSLP’12). Selected
and Revised Papers., number 8114 in Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer, 2013.
[14] Stergios Chatzikyriakidis and Zhaohui Luo. Adjectives in a modern type-theoretical setting. In
Glyn Morrill and Mark-Jan Nederhof, editors, FG, volume 8036 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 159–174. Springer, 2013.
22 CHRISTIAN RETORE´
[15] Philipp Cimiano and Johanna Wenderoth. Automatic acquisition of ranked qualia structures
from the web. In John A. Carroll, Antal van den Bosch, and Annie Zaenen, editors, ACL. The
Association for Computational Linguistics, 2007.
[16] Robin Cooper. Copredication, dynamic generalized quantification and lexical innovation
by coercion. In Fourth International Workshop on Generative Approaches to the Lexicon.
Universite´ de Gene`ve, 2007.
[17] Robin Cooper. Copredication, quantification and frames. In Pogodalla and Prost [51], pages
64–79.
[18] D.A. Cruse. Lexical semantics. Cambridge textbooks in linguistics. Cambridge University
Press, 1986.
[19] Urs Egli and Klaus von Heusinger. The epsilon operator and E-type pronouns. In Urs Egli,
Peter E. Pause, Christoph Schwarze, Arnim von Stechow, and Go¨tz Wienold, editors, Lexical
Knowledge in the Organization of Language, pages 121–141. Benjamins, 1995.
[20] Jean-Yves Girard. Une extension de l’interpre´tation de Go¨del a` l’analyse et son application:
l’e´limination des coupures dans l’analyse et la the´orie des types. In Jens Erik Fenstad, editor,
Proceedings of the Second Scandinavian Logic Symposium, volume 63 of Studies in Logic and
the Foundations of Mathematics, pages 63–92, Amsterdam, 1971. North Holland.
[21] Jean-Yves Girard. The blind spot – lectures on logic. European Mathematical Society, 2011.
[22] David Hilbert and Paul Bernays. Grundlagen der Mathematik. Bd. 2. Springer, 1939. Traduc-
tion franc¸aise de F. Gaillard, E. Guillaume et M. Guillaume, L’Harmattan, 2001.
[23] Ge´rard P. Huet. Re´solution d’e´quations dans des langages d’ordre 1,2,...,ω. The`se de doctorat
d’e´tat, Universite´ Paris VII, 1976.
[24] Hans Kamp and Uwe Reyle. From Discourse to Logic. D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1993.
[25] Yves Lafont. Soft linear logic and polynomial time. Theoretical Computer Science, 318(1–2):163
– 180, 2004. ¡ce:title¿Implicit Computational Complexity¡/ce:title¿.
[26] Mathieu Lafourcade and Alain Joubert. Computing trees of named word usages from a
crowdsourced lexical network. In IMCSIT, pages 439–446, 2010.
[27] Sven Lauer. A comparative study of current theories of polysemy in formal semantics. Master’s
thesis, Cognitive science Osnabru¨ck - Computational Linguistics, 2004.
[28] Alain Lecomte and Myriam Quatrini. Figures of dialogue: a view from ludics. Synthese,
183:59–85, 2011.
[29] Ana¨ıs Lefeuvre, Richard Moot, and Christian Retore´. Traitement automatique d’un corpus de
re´cits de voyages pyre´ne´ens : analyse syntaxique, se´mantique et pragmatique dans le cadre de
la the´orie des types. In Congre`s mondial de linguistique franc¸aise, 2012.
[30] Ana¨ıs Lefeuvre, Richard Moot, Christian Retore´, and Noe´mie-Fleur Sandillon-Rezer. Traite-
ment automatique sur corpus de re´cits de voyages pyre´ne´ens : Une analyse syntaxique,
se´mantique et temporelle. In Traitement Automatique du Langage Naturel, TALN’2012,
volume 2, pages 43–56, 2012.
[31] Albert C. Leisenring. Mathematical logic and Hilbert’s  symbol. University Mathematical
Series. Mac Donald & Co., 1967.
[32] Giuseppe Longo, Kathleen Milsted, and Sergei Soloviev. Coherence and transitivity of subtyp-
ing as entailment. Journal of Logic and Computation, 10(4):493–526, 2000.
[33] Zhaohui Luo. Contextual analysis of word meanings in type-theoretical semantics. In Pogodalla
and Prost [51], pages 159–174.
[34] Zhaohui Luo. Common nouns as types. In Be´chet and Dikovsky [7], pages 173–185.
[35] Zhaohui Luo, Sergei Soloviev, and Tao Xue. Coercive subtyping: Theory and implementation.
Inf. Comput., 223:18–42, 2013.
[36] Bruno Mery, Richard Moot, and Christian Retore´. Plurals: individuals and sets in a richly
typed semantics. In Logic and Engineering of Natural Language Semantics 10 (LENLS 10).
LNCS, 2013.
[37] Bruno Mery and Christian Retore´. Advances in the logical representation of lexical semantics.
In Valeria de Paiva and Larry Moss, editors, Natural Language and Computer Science (LICS
2013 satellite workshop), New-Orleans, 2013.
[38] Bruno Mery and Christian Retore´. Semantic types, lexical sorts and classifiers. In B. Sharp
and M. Zock, editors, 10th International Workshop on Natural Language Processing and
Cognitive Science, Marseilles, September 2013.
[39] Richard Moot. Automated extraction of type-logical supertags from the spoken dutch corpus.
In Srinivas Bangalore and Aravind Joshi, editors, The Complexity of Lexical Descriptions and
its Relevance to Natural Language Processing: A Supertagging Approach. MIT Press, 2007.
[40] Richard Moot. Semi-automated extraction of a wide-coverage type-logical grammar for French.
In Proceedings of Traitement Automatique des Langues Naturelles (TALN), Montreal, 2010.
[41] Richard Moot. Wide-coverage French syntax and semantics using Grail. In Proceedings of
Traitement Automatique des Langues Naturelles (TALN), Montreal, 2010.
THE MONTAGOVIAN GENERATIVE LEXICON 23
[42] Richard Moot, Laurent Pre´vot, and Christian Retore´. A discursive analysis of itineraries
in an historical and regional corpus of travels. In Constraints in discourse, page
http://passage.inria.fr/cid2011/doku.php, Ayay-roches-rouges, France, September 2011.
[43] Richard Moot, Laurent Pre´vot, and Christian Retore´. Un calcul de termes type´s pour la
pragmatique lexicale — chemins et voyageurs fictifs dans un corpus de re´cits de voyages.
In Traitement Automatique du Langage Naturel, TALN 2011, pages 161–166, Montpellier,
France, June 2011.
[44] Richard Moot and Christian Retore´. Second order lambda calculus for meaning assembly:
on the logical syntax of plurals. In Reinhard Muskens, editor, Coconat: Conference on
Computing Natural Reasoning. University of Tilburg, December 2011. http://hal.inria.fr/
hal-00650644.
[45] Richard Moot and Christian Retore´. The logic of categorial grammars: a deductive account
of natural language syntax and semantics, volume 6850 of LNCS. Springer, 2012.
[46] Reinhard Muskens. Anaphora and the logic of change. In Jan van Eijck, editor, JELIA, volume
478 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 412–427. Springer, 1990.
[47] Reinhard Muskens. Combining Montague Semantics and Discourse Representation. Linguistics
and Philosophy, 19:143–186, 1996.
[48] Geoffrey Nunberg. Transfers of meaning. Journal of semantics, 12(2):109–132, 1995.
[49] Barbara Partee. Noun phrase interpretation and type shifting principles. In B.H. Partee and
P.H. Portner, editors, Formal Semantics: The Essential Readings, pages 357–381. Wiley,
2008.
[50] Stanley Peters and Dag Westerst˚ahl. Quantifiers in Language and Logic. Clarendon Press,
2006.
[51] Sylvain Pogodalla and Jean-Philippe Prost, editors. Logical Aspects of Computational Lin-
guistics - 6th International Conference, LACL 2011, Montpellier, France, June 29 - July 1,
2011. Proceedings, volume 6736 of LNCS. Springer, 2011.
[52] James Pustejovsky. The generative lexicon. Computational Linguistics, 17(4):409–441, 1991.
[53] James Pustejovsky. The generative lexicon. M.I.T. Press, 1995.
[54] Livy-Maria Real-Coelho and Christian Retore´. A generative Montagovian lexicon for polyse-
mous deverbal nouns. In 4th World Congress and School on Universal Logic – Workshop on
Logic and linguistics., Rio de Janeiro, April 2013.
[55] Livy-Maria Real-Coelho and Christian Retore´. On the semantics of deverbals in a richly typed
system. Journal of Logic Language and Information, 2013. To appear.
[56] Christian Retore´. Variable types for meaning assembly: a logical syntax for generic noun
phrases introduced by ”most”. Recherches Linguistiques de Vincennes, 41:83–102, 2012.
[57] Christian Retore´. A natural framework for natural language semantics: many sorted logic
and Hilbert operators in type theory. In Ma´rio Edmundo and Boban Velickovic, editors, Logic
colloquium, Evora, 2013.
[58] Christian Retore´. Se´mantique des de´terminants dans un cadre richement type´. In Emmanuel
Morin and Yannick Este`ve, editors, Traitement Automatique du Langage Naturel, TALN
RECITAL 2013, volume 1, pages 367–380. ACL Anthology, 2013.
[59] Sergei Soloviev and David Chemouil. Some Algebraic Structures in Lambda-Calculus with
Inductive Types. In Stefano Berardi, Mario Coppo, and Ferruccio Damiani, editors, TYPES,
volume 3085 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 338–354. Springer, 2003.
[60] Sergei Soloviev and Zhaohui Luo. Coercion completion and conservativity in coercive subtyping.
Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 1-3(113):297–322, 2000.
[61] Leonard Talmy. Fictive motion in language and “ception”. In Paul Bloom, Mary A. Peterson,
Lynn Nadel, and Merrill F. Garrett, editors, Language and Space, pages 211–276. MIT Press,
1999.
[62] Klaus von Heusinger. Definite descriptions and choice functions. In S. Akama, editor, Logic,
Language and Computation, pages 61–91. Kluwer, 1997.
[63] Klaus von Heusinger. Choice functions and the anaphoric semantics of definite nps. Research
on Language and Computation, 2:309–329, 2004.
[64] Tao Xue and Zhaohui Luo. Dot-types and their implementation. In Be´chet and Dikovsky [7],
pages 234–249.
[65] Luke S. Zettlemoyer and Michael Collins. Learning context-dependent mappings from sentences
to logical form. In Keh-Yih Su, Jian Su, and Janyce Wiebe, editors, ACL/IJCNLP, pages
976–984. The Association for Computer Linguistics, 2009.
LaBRI, Universite´ de Bordeaux (& IRIT-CNRS, Toulouse)
E-mail address: christian.retore@labri.fr
URL: http://www.labri.fr/perso/retore
